Case Comments by Chritton, Charles P. & Poscharsky, Thomas L.
Notre Dame Law Review





Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles P. Chritton & Thomas L. Poscharsky, Case Comments, 48 Notre Dame L. Rev. 978 (1973).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol48/iss4/12
CASE COMMENTS
LABOR LAW-SuccESSOR'S BARGAINING OBLIGATION UPHELD--SUccESSOR NOT
BOUND BY PREDECESSOR'S CONTRACT TERMS-SUPREME COURT EMPI-IASIZES
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT IN DETERMINING A SUCCESSOR EMPLOYER'S LABOR
OBLIGATIONS.--In early 1967 the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter
Board) determined that the Wackenhut Corporation security force at Lockheed's
Los Angeles airport facility was an appropriate collective bargaining unit. An
election followed and the United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local No. 162
was certified as the unit's bargaining representative. Within a month, a three-
year collective bargaining agreement was negotiated and signed with Wackenhut.
Lockheed's service contract with Wackenhut was due to expire on June 30,
1967 and in May Lockheed called for bids on its next contract. The bid an-
nouncement included information on Local No. 162's recent certification and
current contract with Wackenhut. Wackenhut and various competitors sub-
mitted bids and at the conclusion of the bidding the contract was awarded to
Burns International Detective Agency, Inc.
The contract with Burns was to take effect July 1, 1967. During June,
Burns hired twenty-seven former Wackenhut employees and transferred fifteen
of its own employees to provide the Lockheed security, but on different employ-
ment terms than listed in the Wackenhut agreement. On July 12, after Burns
had started to perform its contract, the Wackenhut union, Local No. 162, de-
manded that Burns recognize it as the bargaining representative for the em-
ployees at the Lockheed terminal. In addition to recognition, the union de-
manded that Burns adopt the terms of its Wackenhut agreement. Both demands
were refused by Burns.
Local No. 162 then filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board
stating that it was the certified representative of the security employees at the
Lockheed installation, and alleging Burns' refusal to bargain. In December, a
Board trial examiner found that the security force employed by Burns at the
Lockheed terminal was a proper collective bargaining unit (despite the fact that
Burns had similar security forces throughout the Los Angeles area organized and
represented by a single union) and also found that Local No. 162's certification
survived the change in employers. Furthermore, the examiner found that the
employing industry remained unchanged under Burns, that Burns was a suc-
cessor employer and, as such, it had committed the alleged unfair labor practice.
The examiner's remedy ordered Burns to recognize and bargain with Local No.
162, and to assume and give retroactive effect the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement the local had negotiated with Wackenhut.'
In April of 1969, the Board upheld the trial examiner's findings and order.
Additionally, it ruled for the first time that a successor employer was bound by
the terms of its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement.2 The ruling was
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which held
that Burns was a successor employer and was bound by the National Labor Re-
1 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970).
2 Id.
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lations Act3 to recognize and bargain with Local No. 162 but that Burns could
not be held to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by its
predecessor.4
Both Burns and the Board filed a petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. Burns challenged both the trial examiner's finding that its
Lockheed force was a proper bargaining unit and the Board's bargaining order.
The Board maintained that the doctrine of successorship required Burns to
assume the terms of the Wackenhut agreement.
With four justices dissenting, the Supreme Court held: because the bargain-
ing unit remained appropriate5 and the local's certification survived the change
in employers, Burns had a duty to bargain with Local No. 162. Moreover, up-
holding the determination of the Court of Appeals, it found no precedent which
could be a basis for imposing Wackenhut's contract terms on Burns. NLRB v.
Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
I. Historical Development of Elements
In The Burns Question
The National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter Act) seeks to promote in-
dustrial peace by establishing and protecting employee collective bargaining
rights0 While establishing collective bargaining rights and mandating that both
employer and employee must bargain collectively,' the Act expressly provides
that the existence of these rights and duties should not operate to force bargain-
ing concessions from either party.' Thus the Act manifests congressional intent
to adopt collective bargaining as a preferred means for avoiding industrial strife
while maintaining freedom of contract for all bargaining parties.' These two
principles represent competing and opposite interests and tension between the two
naturally resulted as collective bargaining rights were developed and extended."0
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
4 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971).
5 Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 404 U.S. 822 '(1971) granted certiorari
limited to the question of Burns' bargaining duty. Although Burns in its petition had chal-
lenged the unit finding made by the Court of Appeals, certiorari was not granted on this
issue.
6 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
7 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (5), (b) (3) (1970).
8 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
9 S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1935). "The committee wishes to dispel
any false impression that this bill is designed to compel the making of agreements or to permit
governmental supervision of their terms."
Remarks by Senator Walsh reflect the same emphasis on freedom of contract, 79
CONG. REc. 7659 (1935):
[T]hat the bill requires no employer to sign any contract, to make any agreement,
to reach any understanding with any employee or group of employees....
A c.rude illustration is this: The bill indicates the method and manner in which
employees may organize, the method and manner of selecting their representatives
or spokesman, and leads them to the office door of their employer with legal authority
to negotiate for their fellow employees. The bill does not go beyond the office
door...
10 Stem, Binding The Successor Employer to Its Predecessor's Collective Agreement
Under the NLRA 45 TEmPLE L.Q. 1, 2 (1971), documents the friction between these two
aspects of national labor policy.
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In general, national labor policy has developed along two avenues-suits to
enforce or appeal from Board orders as provided in the Act,1 and suits for
contract enforcement as provided for in Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. 2
Board regulatory power is limited by the Act provisions which preserve freedom
of contract in labor contract negotiations and this limitation has been carefully
observed in suits to enforce or appeal from Board bargaining orders. By contrast
however, in contract enforcement suits, which do not involve Board regulatory
power, the focus on freedom of contract has been less apparent. In these cases
primary consideration has been given to the benefits of arbitration and protec-
tion of collective bargaining rights. This emphasis was especially notable in John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston" which held that a successor employer, although
not a party to its predecessor's contract, was bound by an arbitration clause in
that contract. Interpretations of this holding introduced confusion in evaluating
the relative priority and scope of collective bargaining rights vis-a-vis freedom of
contract 4 This confusion introduced by the Wiley decision underlies the Burns
case.
Insuring each party's freedom of agreement to contract terms has been a
hallmark of Supreme Court decisions under the Act. In fact, this freedom has
been given added meaning by the Court interpretations that allow each party to
bring its economic power to the bargaining table and negotiate and agree within
the leverage of that power.'" The fundamental theory of the Act was examined
and held constitutional in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.' There the
Court noted:
The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited
representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may
bring about adjustments and agreements which the Act itself does not at-
tempt to compel.'
7
11 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e),(f) (1970).
12 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
13 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
14 Each of the following decisions held, consistent with Wiley, that a succeeding employer
was bound by an arbitration clause in its predecessor's contract. However, each decision
contained language that indicated Wiley was being read broadly and that successor em-
ployers could be bound by terms other than arbitration clauses. In United States Gypsum
Go. v. United Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38, 44 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 1042
(1968) the court noted: "In the ordinary course of events, a collective bargaining agreement
entered into by the union and the employer will be binding on the employer, or his successor
until it expires." Likewise, in Wackenhut Corp. v. International Union, U.P.G.W., 332 F.2d
954, 958 (9th Cir. 1964), where the court also indicated that the contract was binding on a
successor employer. In United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895
(3rd Cir. 1964), the court enforced an arbitration clause against a successor and noted that
the prior contract was binding insofar as it was a basic guide for the arbitrator. Stem,
supra note 7, at 20-23 discusses the application and extension of the Wiley holding reflected
in these cases.
15 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960). See
also Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 293, 295 (2d Cir. 1966). However, use of economic
power is not unlimited: NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949) held
that an employer may not unilaterally raise wages during negotiations without prior bargaining
on the amount of the increase. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970) prohibits other employer activity
that would undermine collective bargaining rights; likewise employee organizations may not
use their economic power in ways forbidden by 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970).
16 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
17 Id. at 45.
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This concept has been honored by the Court even where its application allowed
an employer the right to bargain for a management rights clause, the use of which
could arguably avoid his duty to bargain. The Court upheld the employer's right
to predicate his agreement to an arbitration clause on a demand for a manage-
ment functions clause, which would remove work schedules (a mandatory
bargaining subject) from arbitration, thereby leaving resolution of work schedule
disputes completely at the discretion of management."8 Even where the Court
recognizes the existence of a labor practice that has potential to frustrate the
national goal of promoting collective bargaining, if the Board reacts to that threat
by fashioning a remedy which requires agreement to substantive contract terms,
the Court, while sympathetic with the desired end, will not enforce the Board's
order. In H. K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 9 the Board had determined that the
only reason the employer insisted upon exclusion of a check-off clause was to
prevent the concluding of a collective bargaining agreement and ordered the em-
ployer's agreement to the clause as an appropriate remedy. While it recognized
the employer's conduct as unfair, the Court refused to enforce a remedy which
deprived the employer of his freedom to contract.20
Notwithstanding the restrictions that freedom of contract imposes on the
Board's enforcement power delineated in the Porter case, the Court, in exercising
its jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, has accorded the
freedom of contract doctrine a less emphatic role." The landmark decision of
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills2 held that Section 301 (a) of the Taft-
Hartley Act22 was a congressional mandate for federal courts to fashion a body
of substantive law in enforcing labor contracts. Development of enforcement
principles has not necessarily been limited by the terms of the Act, but has been
drawn from the entire fabric of national labor policy.24 The enforcement policies
18 NLRB v. American Nat'1 Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 407-09 (1952).
19 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
20 Id. at 107-08. Where the Court stated: It is implicit in the entire structure of the
Act that the Board acts to oversee and referee the process of collective bargaining, leaving
the results of the contest to the bargaining strengths of the parties. It would be anomalous
indeed to hold that while § 8(d) prohibits the Board from relying on a refusal to agree as the
sole evidence of bad-faith bargaining, the Act permits the Board to compel agreement in that
same dispute.
21 Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 112
U. PA. L. REv. 467, 478 (1964). This author contrasts the Court's approach under § 301:
"But whereas freedom of contract has .. .dominated the law of the duty to bargain, it has
been the noble quest for industrial peace that has captured the law of contract enforcement."
22 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
23 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970):
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
24 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) where the Court
noted:
The question then is what is the substantive law to be applied in suits under §
301(a)? We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is
federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor
laws .... The range of judicial inventivesness will be determined by the nature of the




applied when arbitration clauses are at issue are of special importance in the
Burns decision. Collective bargaining agreement terms are viewed as guidelines
rather than precisely stated obligations,25 and arbitration is viewed as a desirable
alternative to strikes where agreement terms are disputed.26 Based on these two
considerations the Supreme Court has developed contract interpretation policies
which submit contract disputes to arbitration whenever possible.2 Its willingness
to find an implied agreement to arbitrate beyond the four comers of the contract
and to submit disputes to an arbitration process which often turns on the applica-
tion of trade practices can be viewed as an indirect limitation28 on the very same
freedom of contract so clearly espoused in unfair labor practice cases.
In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston," relied upon by the Board in
its Burns"0 decision, this national preference for arbitration coupled with a need
to protect collective bargaining rights was held to be a significant enough con-
sideration to impose an arbitration clause on a succeeding employer, despite the
fact that he was not a party to his predecessor's labor contract. The Wiley case
involved Interscience Publishers Inc., a unionized employer, which merged with
Wiley & Sons, a nonunion employer. Wiley did not assume the Interscience col-
lective bargaining agreement, but a majority of the forty Interscience employees
covered by the agreement joined a pre-existing group of three hundred Wiley
employees. Wiley afforded all the new employees the same rights and benefits as
their own employees enjoyed. However, the union which had represented the
Interscience employees brought a contract enforcement suit under Section 301
of the Taft-Hartley Act to compel Wiley's arbitration of vested rights due to
transferred Interscience employees. The action was based on an arbitration
clause in the Interscience contract. The Court held that under federal labor
policy, merger does not necessarily terminate all rights of employees covered by
a collective bargaining agreement and that Wiley, as a successor employer, was
bound by the arbitration clause in its predecessor's agreement. This finding was
based on the following reasoning:
The objectives of national labor policy, reflected in established principles of
federal law, require that the rightful prerogative of owners independently to
rearrange their business and even eliminate themselves as employers be
25 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960):
"The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of the parties. It is more
than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot
wholly anticipate." In addition, the Court noted that contracts which include arbitration
clauses in fact include a variety of unspecified trade practices because arbitrators will rely on
such trade practices in making -their awards.
26 Id. at 578.
27 Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flower Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) held that when an
agreement includes an arbitration clause, a no-strike clause will be implied on the part of the
union. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) held
that when determining if a dispute is arbitrable within a given arbitration clause, in the
absence of language specifically excluding the dispute from arbitration, federal courts are
directed to give the benefit of any doubt to an interpretation that will include -the dispute
within the clause.
28 Wellington, supra note 18, at 494. The author gives a full explanation of the indirect
limitations on freedom of contract resulting from federal enforcement of arbitration clauses.
29 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
30 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970).
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balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in the
employment relationship....
[T]he impressive policy considerations favoring arbitration are not wholly
overborne by the fact that Wiley did not sign the contract being con-
strued .... "I
The Board paralleled Wiley reasoning in Burns and ruled that the policy
considerations promoting collective bargaining rights were significant enough
to impose the terms of a predecessor's labor agreement on an unconsenting suc-
cessor employer. 2 Thus, the tension between collective bargaining rights and
freedom of contract was highlighted on the Burns facts and the relative priority
and accommodation between these competing interests was the basic question
before the Court.
IL Bums' Duty to Bargain
The thrust of the Board ruling was to establish Bums' duty to bargain re-
quired by the doctrine of successorship 38 The Board found that an appropriate
unit had been certified under Wackenhut, that Bums had hired as a majority
of its work force the same employees to do the same work at the same worksite,
and that the nature of the employing industry remained unchanged after the
change in employers."' In the Board's view, these facts were sufficient to establish
Burns as a successor employer, and under the doctrine of successorship, successor
employers are required to bargain with their predecessor's union. The Board
thus found that Burns was required to bargain with Local No. 162.
Implicit in the Board's reasoning were the more specific factors required
by the Court to establish a duty to bargain. The Court upheld the Board's
bargaining order, but established Bums' bargaining obligation on a more precise
basis. The Court held that when Burns chose to hire former Wackenhut em-
ployees as a majority of its own work force the choice carried with it an obliga-
tion to recognize and bargain with the union certified to represent those em-
ployees."5 Two elements were identified as a basis for this obligation-the finding
that an appropriate bargaining unit had survived the change in employers and
that the majority of employees hired by Burns were represented by a recently
certified bargaining agent.3 6 As noted by the dissent, the Court carefully de-
clined to adopt the language of successorshipY The majority opinion made no
attempt to evaluate a change in the employing industry, a test prevalent in suc-
cessorship findings, but rather established a bargaining duty on the continued
existence of an appropriate bargaining unit and a presumption of union majority
status which follows recent certification.
The Court did not hear argument on the appropriateness of the Bums
31 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549-50 (1964).
32 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 350 (1970).
33 Id. at 354.
34 Id. at 353-54.
35 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 278 (1972).
36 Id. at 281.
37 Id. at 296.
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bargaining unit,3" rather, it simply accepted the unit ruling made by the Court
of Appeals." In developing its finding of successorship, the Board only indirectly
established the continued appropriateness of the Bums unit. Bums, however,
challenged the unit appropriateness in the Court of Appeals, which resolved the
matter in favor of the Board. The Board had argued that the community of
interest necessary to establish an appropriate unit had been demonstrated by
several facts.4" Under Burns the Lockheed security force was managed by a
full-time supervisor with power to hire and fire. The group was physically sepa-
rated from other Burns employees in the Los Angeles area and the Lockheed
group was paid a higher wage than other Los Angeles area security groups em-
ployed by Burns.4 This argument was consistent with Board policy for deter-
mining single location units of multiple location employers adopted in Haag
Drug Co., Inc. :2
Absent a bargaining history in a more comprehensive unit or functional
integration of a sufficient degree to obliterate separate identity, the em-
ployee's "fullest freedom" is maximized.... by treating employees in a single
[location] . . . as ... an appropriate unit.43
Noting the latitude of the Board's discretion in unit findings, the Court of
Appeals upheld the Board's finding that Burns' Lockheed force was an appro-
priate unit even though employees at other Burns locations were represented by
a single bargaining representative.4 The Supreme Court accepted this unit
holding and developed it as a necessary element in establishing a duty to bargain.
In the Court's analysis, the appropriate unit finding was joined with a pre-
sumption that the union maintained its majority status after the change in em-
ployers had been completed. Board certification of a bargaining representative
produces an almost conclusive presumption that majority status of the union
continues for a reasonable time.45 This reasonable time is usually held to be at
least a year, reflecting the limitations on Board directed elections manifest in
Section 9 of the Act." This presumption survives despite employee change of
38 Id. at 277.
39 Id. at 278.
40 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir.
1971).
41 Id.
42 169 N.L.R.B. 877 (1968).
43 Id. at 877.
44 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970) gives the Board discretion in making unit determinations.
A.F. of L. v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940) held there would be no direct review of the Board's
unit determinations, rather appropriate review of unit determinations would be available to
employers if and when the Board found it necessary to enforce a bargaining order. An excep-
tion to the above doctrine was recognized in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) where
the Board had violated an express statutory limitation regulating its power to define units in-
cluding professional employees. The unit finding in Burns was consistent with prior Board
rulings. Heublein, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 1337 '(1958) had demonstrated -that in unit findings it
was immaterial that no separate units had been established at other of the employer's plants.
45 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
46 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970). Subsection 159(c) (3) does not allow the Board to direct an
election in any unit within which an election has been held in the preceding twelve months.
Subsection 159(e) (2) does not allow the Board to direct an election to rescind a union security
agreement negotiated between a union and employer in any unit within which an election has
been held in the preceding twelve months.
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heart" and even where a large employee turnover is evident.4" The theory
reflects a need to establish stable bargaining conditions upon which each side
can rely and avoid the uncertainty that would beset the bargaining process if
repeated challenges to the bargaining authority of a certified representative were
allowed. The presumption, first announced by the Court in a case involving only
one employer,49 has been applied to succeeding employers. NLRB v. Armatop°
demonstrated that a change in ownership will not necessarily destroy this pre-
sumption. In Armato the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held there
was no reason to believe employees would desire a change in bargaining agents
simply because of a change in owners, and therefore it enforced a bargaining
order against a succeeding employer who had purchased the business shortly
after a bargaining representative had been certified. The Board has viewed the
application of this presumption to succeeding employers as essential if collective
bargaining rights are to be meaningful. This position was clearly established in
Maintenance, Inc.: 5
It would be virtually impossible for employees to achieve collective-bargain-
ing rights in an employing industry which is periodically subject to a possible
change of employers if with every change the employees must again resort
to the Board's processes in order to demonstrate anew their desire to be
represented .... 52
The Burns Court endorsed the extension of this presumption to succeeding em-
ployers where a "majority of the employees hired" by the succeeding employer
"are represented by a recently certified bargaining agent.""3 The presumption,
accompanied by the finding that an appropriate bargaining unit continued to
exist, was enough in the Court's view to bring Burns within the bargaining man-
date of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act."
It is critical to note that the Court endorsed the presumption of majority
status only where a majority of the successor's employees were formerly repre-
sented by the union that seeks recognition. In the normal case where only the
original employer is involved, the presumption continues for a year regardless of
actual majority. The requirement that at least a majority of the new group have
been previously represented, while not insuring that these are the same individuals
47 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954). Shortly after an 8 to 5 vote designating a
representative, 9 employees indicated that they no longer wanted union representation.
48 See NLRB v. John S. Swift Co., Inc., 302 F.2d 342, 345 (1962) which held that,
absent other evidence of probative value, the presumption continues even after the certifica-
tion year, despite the fact that a majority of the originally certified unit have terminated their
employment.
49 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
50 199 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1952).
51 148 N.L.R.B. 1299 (1964).
52 Id. at 1302.
53 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281 (1972). But it is not
clear from this holding or the holdings cited by the Burns Court if the majority of the pre-
decessor's employees present in the succeeding employer's work group also have to have been
a majority of the predecessor's employees. Whether a minority of the predecessor's employees
that constitute a majority of the successor's employees will be sufficient to carry the presump-
tion is not answered.
54 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)'(5) (1970) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.
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that authorized the representative, does provide a general check against imposing
representation where it is certain that a majority of the group have never assented
to union representation. In developing this concept, the Court endorsed and
clarified lower court holdings that the presumption of union majority could be
correctly applied to succeeding employers. 5
55 The following chart lists successorship cases cited by the Burns Court or this comment.
The chart illustrates the relationship between the number of transferred employees and the size
of the predecessor's and successor's work forces.
Date of Date of No. of employ- No. of No. of
Certifi- Successor ees in prede- employees prede-
cation Takeover cessor's unit in cessor's
Successorship
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Secu-
rity Serv., Inc., 406 U.S.
272 (1972).
NLRB v. Zayre Corp., 424
F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1970).
Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc.
v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025
(7th Cir. 1969).
NLRB v. McFarland, 306
F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1962).
NLRB v. Auto Ventshade,
Inc., 276 F.2d 303 (5th
Cir. 1960).
NLRB v. Lunder Shoe Corp.,
211 F.2d 284 (1st Cir.
1954).
NLRB v. Armato, 199 F.2d
800 (7th Cir. 1952).
NLR.B v. Blair Quarries.
Inc., 152 F.2d 25 (4th
Cir. 1945).
No Successorship
Lincoln Private Police, Inc.,
189 N.L.R.B. No. 103
(Apr. 12, 1971).
NLRB v. John Stepp's
Friendly Ford, Inc.,
338 F.2d 833 (9th Cir.
1964).
NLRB v. Downtown Bakery
Corp., 330 F.2d 921 (6th
Cir. 1964).
Mar 1967 Jut 1967
Apr 1966 Jum 1966 69
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By establishing Bums' duty to bargain on the combined facts of an appro-
priate unit, a majority of old employees, and recent certification, the Court dis-
tilled and applied the central elements of the successorship doctrine developed
by various Courts of Appeals and the Board. This doctrine seeks to promote
continuity of collective bargaining rights during the disruptive period that accom-
panies a change in ownership.5" Cases which have involved successorship deter-
mination have considered continued unit appropriateness and the presumption
of majority status only indirectly and have focused specifically on the unchanged
character of the employing industry. The early decision of NLRB v. Colenrt"
reflected this approach in holding that, despite the change in ownership form
rendered by the death of one of the partnership partners, the "nature of the
employing industry" was essentially unchanged and the surviving partner was
obliged to continue to bargain collectively with the employees' representative.
The doctrine was given significant impetus by the holding in John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. v. Livingston,"5 which, as noted earlier, held that even though the successor,
Wiley, had not been a party to its predecessor's labor contract it was nevertheless
bound by an arbitration clause in the agreement. Further, it will be recalled that
the Wiley Court reached this result by emphasizing the need to protect collective
bargaining rights of employees from sudden changes in the employment rela-
tionship " where there was substantial continuity of identity in the business enter-
prise before and after the change. 0
Subsequent successorship decisions, although not extending the successor's
obligation to assumption of contract terms, have used the "substantial continuity
separate elections established the unit, showed that the major-
ity of this group favored another representative and provided
a basis for employer's good faith doubt of majority status.
NLRB v. Alamo White
Truck Serv., Inc., 273
F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1959) Jim 1957 .............. 12 mechanics 7 7*
3 parts men
Here it was certain that the five mechanics not hired were all
union supporters and the presumption of majority status failed.
Indicates that the same supervisor was also retained.
Chart Summary
1. In all cases finding a duty to bargain successor employers have on the day of takeover hired
as a majority of their work force employees who were also employees of the predecessor.
2. In most cases finding a duty to bargain, the majority of the successor's employees have also
been a majority of the predecessor's work force. A notable exception is NLRB v. Armato
where the court stated "MIhe fact that they (employees) found themselves fewer in number
than before warrants no implication that they no longer desire representation."
3. The examples under "no successorship" illustrate several points. Where less than a majority
of the successor's employees were predecessor's employees, as in NLRB v. John Stepp's Friendly
Ford, Inc., the presumption of union majority status could not be applied and successorship
was defeated. NLRB u. Alamo White Truck Serv., Inc. and NLRB v. Downtown Bakery Corp.
demonstrate that the presumption can be overcome by an independent showing that the
transferred employees did not favor representation at the time the election was held in their
unit. Lincoln Private Police, Inc. shows that even where the presumption is appropriate
successorship could be defeated by a showing that the employing industry had undergone
significant change.
56 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964).
57 105 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1939).
58 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
59 Id. at 549.
60 Id. at 550-51.
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of identity" test to impose a duty to bargain. The facts of corporate merger, sale
of assets, lack of dealing between predecessor and successor, lack of assumption
of business contracts, or the non-use of predecessor's equipment have not been
controlling in a finding of successorship."1 Rather, the determinations have
focused on the employees and any change in their employment circumstances
relative to the work they perform. Thus, successorship has been established when
the same product lines, department organization, employee identification and
job function remained unchanged because there was not a significant change in
the employing industry."s Such findings have been made despite the facts that
the new employer had altered management policies or that a larger bargaining
unit was equally appropriate. Thus, the factual inquiry required by successor-
ship focused upon the nature of the employing industry rather than the identity
of a specific employer; and this way the doctrine developed a duty to bargain
if the employing industry was found unchanged rather than making specific unit
and majority status determinations.
Although the Burns Court avoided adopting the successorship doctrine per
se, the requirements it set forth for establishing a succeeding employer's duty to
bargain-unit appropriateness plus continued presumption of majority status-
were elements of the successorship test. Successorship was defeated where unit
appropriateness or majority status could not be shown 3 and to that extent the
two tests are similar. Under the successorship doctrine, however, the "nature
of the employing industry" tended to become a single all-inclusive test. Thus
without specific appraisal of continued unit appropriateness or majority status,
a bargaining duty would be upheld if the employing industry continued un-
changed. Conversely, the duty could be avoided without further inquiry, on a
showing of change in the employing industry.6 " The Court did not ignore this
factor but viewed it as part of the unit determination:
It would be a wholly different case if the Board had determined that be-
cause Bums' operational structure and practices differed from those of
Wackenhut, the Lockheed bargaining unit was no longer an appropriate
one.
65
The net result is that the Court based a successor's bargaining duty on the same
fundamentals the Act requires to generate any bargaining duty.e" In so doing,
the Court avoided the language and elements of the successorship doctrine that
were superficial and that could only foster future confusion and distortion of
the bargaining duty mandated by the Act.
61 See NLRB v. Zayre Corp., 424 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1970); Tom-A-Hawk Transit,
Inc. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1969); S. S. Kresge Co. v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1225
(6th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. McFarland, 306 F.2d 219 (loth Cir. 1962).
62 E.g., NLRB v. Zayre Corp., 424 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1970).
63 See NLRB v. John Stepp's Friendly Ford, Inc., 338 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1964).
64 NLRB v. Alamo White Truck Serv., Inc., 273 F.2d 238 '(5th Cir. 1959).
65 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 280 (1972) (footnote omitted).
66 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) requires that a bargaining agent be designated by a
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes and 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5)
directs employers to bargain with employee representatives that meet these requirements.
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Four Justices dissented from the holding that Burns had a duty to bargain.67
They argued that both the unit status and union majority findings resulted from
a conclusion of successorship6s and that as developed in Wiley, successorship
could not be established from only a "naked" transfer of employees but required
in addition, a transfer of assets or contractual dealings between predecessor and
successor. 9 The dissent questioned whether the unit and majority status findings
could withstand analysis when deprived of the successorship reasoning.7"
The Burns majority, however, based neither of these findings on successor-
ship. As noted above, the unit appropriateness had been specifically argued and
upheld in the Court of Appeals on independent grounds. Further, the dissents
call for mathematical proof of union majority status 1 ignored the recognized
necessity of applying a presumption of majority status after certification. Adop-
tion of the presumption was necessary to effectuate the policies of the Acte' and
the dissent argument requiring exact proof was inconsistent with Court precedent
on bargaining duties.
The dissent's argument that successorship should not be imposed without a
transfer in assets between employers ignored the contrasting facts in Wiley and
Burns and the fact that the majority opinion in Burns eschewed the successorship
doctrine. The dissent believed that the factors which developed Wiley's duty
to arbitrate were not controlling where a significant lack of continuity in the
business under the successor would make unreasonable the imposition of his
predecessor's contract terms.73 But Wiley developed a duty to arbitrate under a
predecessor's contract terms whereas Burns developed a duty to bargain. The
dissent's Wiley analogy concluded with a bargaining duty controlled by a transfer
of assets between employers.74 However, this requirement misdirects the bar-
gaining duty analysis.
Under the Act, bargaining rights arise when an appropriate group of em-
ployees vote to be represented at the bargaining table. 5 Bargaining rights are a
function of the employee group and the creation of the rights has little relation
to the assets of the employer. Therefore to require that survival of the rights
depends on an exchange of assets between employers, even where the character
of the employee group remains largely unchanged, seems inconsistent with the
nature of bargaining rights. The Burns majority made the bargaining duty of
a successor turn only on characteristics of the employee group required by the
Act. The dissents focus on assets introduced a spurious factor which paralleled
the employing industry test so carefully avoided by the majority.
The dissent's objection to imposing a bargaining duty where there has
67 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 296 (1972).
68 Id. at 297-98.
69 Id. at 304, 307.
70 Id. at 299.
71 Id. at 297. The dissent argued that many of the 27 Wackenhut employees hired by
Burns might have voted against a union during the election and that together with the 15
new members in the Burns unit who never voted it was possible that a majority of 'the Burns
unit did not favor a union.
72 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
73 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 301 (1972).
74 Id. at 307.
75 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
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simply been a transfer of employees highlights the unanswered questions of
Burns. Assuming that an appropriate bargaining unit survives the change in
employers where there has only been a "naked transfer of employees," when is
it valid to apply a presumption of majority status to the bargaining agent that
seeks to represent the employees of the succeeding employer? Recent union
certification was relied upon to uphold the presumption in Burns. However, in
citing Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc. v. NLRB6 with approval, the Burns Court
affirmed the application of the presumption where only employees were trans-
ferred and certification was long standing. The Burns decision established that
the transferred workers must be at least a majority of the successor's work force
before bargaining can be required. Even with this limitation, however, there
are at least two cases where application of the Burns rationale is uncertain:
first, where, although the predecessor ceases to exist, the succeeding employer
is long established, operates from a single location and may or may not be
unionized; second, where both the predecessor and the succeeding employer con-
tinue to operate but the successor has, as a majority of his work force, employees
hired away from the predecessor. In the second instance it is probable that the
transfer of employees will take place over a longer period of time with only a
few employees hired at any one time. Where the transfer of employees is subtle
the concern expressed by the Burns dissent seems warranted and may be con-
trolling in future litigation."77
III. Successor's Change in Employment
Terms Not a Refusal to Bargain
A duty to bargain requires that an employer make no unilateral changes in
employment terms without first bargaining to impassesu The basis of this rule
is that such changes undermine the effectiveness of a union's bargaining au-
thority. Unilateral employer conduct dilutes membership confidence in the
union's ability to negotiate and ignores representative status which the Act
confers on certified representatives. 9 In Overnite Transportation Co., Inc., the
employer purchased a unionized trucking operation and retained all equipment
and employees. On the first day of operation the employer put into effect its
own lower wage scale without offering the union an opportunity to bargain.'
76 419 F.2d 1025 '(7th Cir. 1969).
77 The dissent urges that where competitive efforts result in the successor's expansion and
need for more employees-for instance when new contract awards increase a successor's pro-
duction-requiring union recognition as a result of hiring an experienced work force would
inhibit the flow of commerce. The dissent cited Lincoln Private Police, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B.
No. 103 (Apr. 12, 1971), a case decided by the Board after Burns, as support for its posi-
tion that no bargaining duty should result where only employees are transferred. In Lincoln,
the Board did not find a duty to bargain even where a majority of the successor's employees
were represented by a union under -the predecessor employer. This holding was based on
the fact that under the new employer the employing industry had changed sufficiently with
the result that Lincoln was not a successor. In light of the Burns holding, however, it would
seem that if the change in the nature of the employing industry which the Board found
controlling cannot be used to show the inappropriateness of the new unit, then the Board
will be required to decide the case differently.
78 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).
79 Id. at 744.
80 157 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1966).
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The Board applied the unilateral change doctrine and ruled that a successor's
duty to bargain included the injunction to refrain from unilaterally changing
the benefits presently enjoyed by the employees until such change is justified by
a bargaining impasse."1
Citing Overnite as precedent, the Board decision implied that when Burns
initiated operations under different terms than Wackenhut it had taken unilateral
action violative of the bargaining duty. 2 Burns approved the Board action in
Overnite but made a careful distinction-it is only a unilateral change in terms
after the bargaining duty itself is clearly established that violates the Act.'2 That
is, where facts clearly indicated that the new employer planned to retain all the
predecessor's employees, the Court found it appropriate that the successor con-
sult the employee's bargaining representative before fixing his employment
terms." However, where the bargaining duty is only nascent at the time an
employer must fix his terms, fixing terms different from his predecessor could
not be a violation of the bargaining duty. Burns was receiving applications from
several sources and entertained the possibility that some of their present employees
might be transferred to augment newly hired employees. Their relationship
with the union was uncertain during the hiring process and at no time until
the hiring was complete was there any obligation to bargain with the union.
Therefore the implementation of employment terms offered during the hiring
period before Burns' bargaining duty was apparent could not have been a failure
to bargain"' and the Court properly refused to enforce the Board order to make
the employees whole for losses suffered by Burns' refusal to adopt Wackenhut's
contract terms.8'
This holding is consistent with the theory that supports the unilateral change
doctrine and in practical terms seems best suited for promoting industrial peace.
It would be unfeasible to require an employer to go through a hiring phase
that may never result in a duty to bargain and deny him the ability to offer
definite employment terms while taking applications. Industrial peace, in some
measure, is geared to employee expectations and seems a more likely result from
the Court approach. A more realistic opportunity for industrial peace is provided
when an employee accepts new terms at the outset with a new employer where
a later established bargaining duty and subsequent negotiation may improve those
terms, than by requiring that employees be paid at the previous, higher rate for
several months while a bargaining duty and bargaining terms are determined.
The higher rate may well be inconsistent with the new employer's economic
posture, with the prospect that wage negotiations will fail and wages could be
reduced after several months of employment. The Court's position takes advan-
tage of employee expectations in a change-over situation characterized by a re-
hiring process and thus improves the opportunity for industrial peace.
81 Id., enforced 372 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967). See
also, Harold W. Hinson v. NLRB, 428 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1970).
82 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 349-50 (1970).
83 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 294 (1972).
84 Id. at 294-95.
85 Id. at 295.
86 Id. at 295-96.
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IV. No Duty to Accept Predecessor's Contract Terms
Echoing Wiley language that raised national labor policy supporting arbi-
tration above the requirement of privity, the Board in Burns determined that
national interest in promoting collective bargaining rights could achieve the
same result: m
The question ... narrows to whether the national labor policy embodied
in the Act requires the successor employer to take over and honor a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement negotiated on behalf of the employing enterprise
by the predecessor. We hold that, absent unusual circumstances, the Act
imposes such an obligation.9s
The Board combined the Wiley rationale with the employing industry test pro-
duced by the successorship doctrine to overcome Burns' lack of consent to the
contract terms. The key is that a contract existed with the employing industry
and, in effect, was deemed to have been negotiated on behalf of all employers
in that industry who might later employ the contracting employees. 9 In so
extending the duty of a successor employer, the Board elected to insure collective
bargaining rights at the expense of an equally important aspect of national labor
policy-freedom of contract. This election of values was clearly apparent when
the Board cited Section 8(d) of the Act as statutory authority for its findings.
The section emphasizes collective bargaining as a device for equalizing the bar-
gaining relationship, but the Board ignored provisions of the same section which
give equal weight to the policy that neither party engaged in collective bargain-
ing is compelled to agree to any proposal.
The Supreme Court refused to adopt the Board's reading of the Act and
nullified the Board's overzealous endorsement of collective bargaining rights
insofar as that endorsement reduced freedom of contract.9" The Court upheld
this freedom and the need for collective bargaining agreements that reflect the
87 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 350 (1970) where
the Board found:
The impressive policy considerations favoring the maintenance and adherence to
existing collective-bargaining agreements are not wholly overborne by the fact
that Burns has not signed the contract here in issue. Nor can a holding that Burns
is obligated to honor and adhere to the express terms of the contract readily be
equated with compelling Burns to agree to a bargaining proposal or make a con-
cession it is unwilling to make. Indisputably, there is a contract. That contract
covers the employees of the employing industry which Burns took over; it was
negotiated on behalf of the employing enterprise by Wackehut, Burns' predecessor.
That contract is reasonably related to Burns through its takeover of Wackenhut's
Lockheed service functions and its hiring of Wackenhut employees. We find, there-
fore, that Burns is bound to that contract as if it were a signatory thereto, and
that its failure to maintain the contract in effect is violative of Section 8(d) and
8(a) (5) of the Act. (Footnotes omitted.)
88 Id. at 350. But see Emerald Maintenance, Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139 (Mar. 5, 1971).
Here the Board found that applications of its Burns rule would be inappropriate where com-
petitive bids for government contracts could not include estimates of wage increases. The
Board reasoned that imposition of the rule here would result in less arm's-length collective
bargaining.
89 William J. Bums Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 350 (1970). This
same reading of Wiley was evident in several lower court cases. See note 11, supra.
90 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 291 (1972).
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unaided economic strength of the respective parties as fundamental requirements
of the national labor relations scheme. 1 The Court based its refusal to uphold
the Board squarely on the language of the Act:
Section 8(d) of the Act expressly provides that the existence of such bar-
gaining obligation "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession."9' 2
Citing H. K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB,9" the Court continued:
This bargaining freedom means both that parties need not make any con-
cessions as a result of government compulsion and that they are free from
having contract provisions imposed upon them against their will.94
By refusing to enforce the Board's ruling ordering assumption of the con-
tract terms the Burns Court distinguished Wiley's application. While the Board
had read Wiley as an opportunity to expand and protect collective bargaining
rights in change-over situations, the Supreme Court characterized the Wiley
decision as a "limited accommodation between the legislative endorsement of
freedom of contract and the judicial preference for peaceful arbitral settlement
of labor disputes."95 The "limited accommodation" was possible in Wiley where
enforcement of an arbitration clause was sought under Section 301 and sub-
stantial continuity of the business enterprise was reflected by a merger of pre-
decessor and successor. But Burns clearly indicates that while limited accommo-
dations with freedom of contract are possible at the will of the Court, no abridge-
ment of this freedom by Board process will be tolerated.
Furthermore the Wiley decision was couched in broad terms and Board
reliance upon it to extend contract terms to successors was not unreasonable.
Wiley had emphasized that federal law controlled96 in establishing Wiley's duty
to arbitrate. However, the Burns Court noted Wiley's obligation dealt only:
[W]ith a merger occurring against a background of state law that embodied
the general rule that in merger situations the surviving corporation is liable
for the obligations of the disappearing corporation.97
91 Id. at 287-88. Explaining the need to preserve freedom of contract for bargaining
parties the court wrote:
Preventing industrial strife is an important aim of federal labor legislation, but
Congress has not chosen to make the bargaining freedom of employers and unions
totally subordinate -to this goal. When a bargaining impasse is reached, strikes and
lockouts may occur. This bargaining freedom means both that parties need not
make any concessions as a result of Government compulsion and that they are free
from having contract provisions imposed upon them against their will.
. . . Strife is bound to occur if the concessions that must be honored do not
correspond to the relative economic strength of the parties.
92 Id. at 282.
93 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
94 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287 (1972). Contra, Brief
for Board at 11, which uses the link provided by a contract with the employing industry to
distinguish Porter. Stem, supr= note 7, at 26-27 gives a cogent argument in support of the
Board's use of Wiley doctrine and distinguishes Porter because a contract exists with the
employing industry.
95 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 286 (1972).
96 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1964).
97 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv.. Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 286 (1972) (citations omitted).
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Thus Burns was easily distinguished because nothing indicated Burns was as-
suming the obligations of the contract" or assumption of its predecessor's financial
obligations. Burns was further distinguished because it involved no arbitration
and was an unfair labor practice proceeding rather than a contract enforcement
suit.
99
In denying enforcement of the Board's order, the Court catalogued economic
ills that would follow from the adoption of the Board's ruling.' The Court
viewed Board action in Burns as inconsistent with Board rules in other areas,'
and noted the need for exceptions already recognized by the Board.0° In the
Court's analysis these reasons demonstrated the impractical weakness of a rule
requiring successors to assume the terms of their predecessor's labor contract.
The Court's distinction between its power to fashion national labor policy
in contract enforcement suits and thereby protect employees' collective bargaining
rights during changes in the employee-employer relationship by imposing arbi-
tration terms on unconsenting employers, and the Board's lack of power under
the Act to implement similar protection in the same circumstances illustrates the
curious, but unavoidable difference in results based on form. Whatever the
importance of vested rights protected in Wiley, the immediate effect of a lower
salary is a far more "sudden" and detrimental change in the employment rela-
tionship. Yet this circumstance must go unprotected because the action was
brought in the context of an unfair labor practice and the Board, in handling
its cases, is clearly controlled by the definitions and limitations of the Act.
The irony of this result is not adequately explained by the Court's reference
to the difference between labor practice proceedings and Section 301 enforcement
suits. Perhaps a more straightforward explanation, reading Wiley and Burns
together, is that arbitration terms were imposed on Wiley because it was found
to have assumed the contract during merger. The "substantial continuity of
business" test as applied in Wiley therefore amounts to only a characterization
of that assumption rather than an independent test that imposes contract terms
on a succeeding employer. Absent merger or facts which demonstrate intent to
assume its predecessor's contract terms, a successor cannot be bound by those
terms.
98 Id. at 287.
99 Id. at 285.
100 Id. at 287-88. The Court felt that the ultimate effect of enforcement would dis-
courage and inhibit the transfer of capital and would shackle successors with hiring, dis-
charge, and seniority provisions that could effectively impede needed adjustments in business
practices.
101 Id. at 284. After the Burns ruling the Board declined to impose existing contract
terms on a successor union. General Dynamics Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (July 24, 1970)
held that a certified representative that followed a decertified union was not bound by the
terms of a current contract negotiated between the decertified union and the employer.
Also a prior Board ruling, Randolph Rubber Co., Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 496 '(1965), permitted
a successor employer that did not assume the contract of its predecessor to refuse to bargain
based on a good faith doubt of union majority status. After Burns, however, this result
would not be possible because the normal contract bar rules announced in Oilfield Main-
tenance Co., Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 1384, 1387 (1963), would apply and the contract imposed
on the successor would bar a good faith challenge for a three year period.
102 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 290 (1972). The Board
had made exceptions to its Burns ruling in Emerald Maintenance, Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. No.




It is apparent from Burns that an employer's decision to hire a majority of
its work force from a predecessor's bargaining unit, where that unit remains
appropriate for collective bargaining, will generate a duty to bargain collectively
with the unit's present bargaining representative. The employees' designation
of a given representative is not disturbed by a change in employers and the Court
correctly rejected arguments that would limit continuation of bargaining rights
to only those instances where assets are exchanged between employers. Even
where there is only a "naked transfer of employees," if the factors that normally
allow the exercise of collective bargaining rights exist, then those rights should
persist despite a change in employers. The strength of the Court's evaluation of
a successor's bargaining duty is its focus on the bargaining duty requirements
set forth in the Act. Thus a successor's bargaining duty is consistent with the
statutory mandate which requires all employers to bargain collectively with
representatives chosen by their employees.
Absent any voluntary assumption of contract terms and any asset transfer
which might imply an assumption of contract obligations in general or provide
a basis for enforcement of an arbitration clause in particular, a succeeding em-
ployer is not bound by the contract terms of its predecessor. The contract holds
no obligation for the successor, and its refusal to accept the terms where it is
otherwise fulfilling its bargaining obligation, will not be a violation of the Act.
In reaching this result the Court upheld congressional intent that sought to im-
plement collective bargaining while not interfering with the bargaining leverage
of either party. The Board had clearly distorted the language of the Act by
establishing a more burdensome duty for successor employers. The Court, in
overruling the Board, leaves the successor employer free to negotiate whatever
terms its bargaining strength and business needs dictate. The soundness of the
Burns decision is that it is consistent with the limitations of the Act and prior
decisions defining the bargaining duty. By requiring no more from successor
employers than the bargaining standard applied to employers in general it has
maintained a uniform policy for all employers.
Charles P. Chrftton
FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION-LIFE INSURANCE-§ 2042-BROAD FIDUCIARY
POWERS AcQuIRED, RATHER THAN RETAINED, BY AN INSURED OVER LIFE IN-
SURANcE POLICIES Do NOT CONSTITUTE INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP UNDER §
2042 (2) UNLESS THE INSURED CAN EXERCISE THEM FOR HIS OWN ECONOmIC
BENEFrr.-Hector R. Skifter more than three years prior to his death assigned
all of his interests in nine insurance policies on his life to his first wife, Naomi.
Naomi died testate less than a year after this transfer. Under her will, her
residuary estate, which included the nine insurance policies, was to be placed in
trust. The income from the residuary trust was to be paid to their daughter,
Janet, for life and, upon Janet's death, there were provisions for the distribution
of the remaining principal to other persons.
[Vol. 48:978]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Under Naomi's will Skifter was appointed executor and trustee of the
residuary trust. As trustee he was authorized in his absolute discretion to pay
over the whole or any part of the trust principal to Janet, whether or not such
payment resulted in the termination of the trust. Hector was also given broad
powers of management and control over the trust corpus. None of these powers,
however, could have been exercised for his own benefit. In 1964 Skifter died and
the Chase Manhattan Bank, in its capacity as successor trustee, collected a total of
$121,923.52 in proceeds from the nine insurance policies on his life. The Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue determined that these proceeds were includable
in Skifter's gross estate under § 2042 (2) of the Internal Revenue Code,' since,
under the terms of Naomi's trust, Skifter possessed incidents of ownership in the
assigned policies.
The Tax Court disagreed with the Commissioner and ruled in favor of the
estate.' On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed and
held: broad fiduciary powers acquired by the insured long after he had divested
himself of all interest in the policies, and which the insured could not exercise
for his own benefit, are not an "incident of ownership" within the intended scope
of § 2042(2). Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972).
Section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code is a specific statutory section
for the inclusion of insurance proceeds in the gross estate of the insured.3 Since
1954 insurance proceeds have been includable under § 2042(2) only if the in-
sured possessed any of the "incidents of ownership" in the insurance policies at
the time of his death. Although this section is not exclusive and any of the other
nine sections dealing with the gross estate (§§ 2033-2041) might require in-
clusion, only under this section are proceeds includable as "insurance." 4
1 INT. RaV. CODE of 1954, § 2042 provides:
Proceeds of Life Insurance.
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
(1) RECEIVABLE BY THE EXECUTOR.-To the extent of the amount receivable
by the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent.
(2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER BENEFICIARIES.-To the extent of the amount
receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the
decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the inci-
dents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person.
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term "incident of ownership" includes a
reversionary interest (whether arising by the express terms of the policy or other
instrument or by operation of law) only if the value of such reversionary interest
exceeded 5 percent of the value of the policy immediately before the death of the
decedent. As used in this paragraph, the term "reversionary interest" includes a
possibility that the policy, or the proceeds of the policy, may return to the decedent
or his estate, or may be subject to a power of disposition by him. The value of a
reversionary interest at any time shall be determined (without regard to the fact of
the decedent's death) by usual methods of valuation, including the use of tables of
mortality and actuarial principles, pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary or his delegate. In determining the value of a possibility that the policy or
proceeds thereof may be subject to a power of disposition by the decedent, such
possibility shall be valued as if it were a possibility that such policy or proceeds may
return to the decedent or his estate.
2 Estate of Hector R. Skifter, 56 T.C. 1190 (1971).
3 If the decedent owns insurance on the life of another, the replacement value of the
policy upon the date of his death is includable under § 2033 as property in which the decedent
owned an interest at the date of death. See B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INcomE ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION 1237 (4th ed. 1972).
4 For example, if the insured should die within three years of an assignment of the
incidents of ownership, the proceeds might be included in the insured's gross estate as a
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In the last several years an impressive array of cases has dealt with life
insurance in almost every conceivable estate tax context.5 It appears that the
Internal Revenue Service is using every possible opportunity to test the scope of
the "incidents of ownership" test under § 2042.6 Large amounts of tax revenue
are at stake at the present time and the rapid growth rate of life insurance cov-
erage promises greater revenue production in the future. In 1971 over 1.5 trillion
dollars of life insurance was in force in the United States and approximately 7.4
billion dollars of benefit payments were made to beneficiaries.' These figures
represent an increase of 139% and 107.3%, respectively, between 1961 and
1971.8 In 1971 the amount of coverage in force increased 7.3% over 1970.1 One
of the areas in which the Internal Revenue Service has recently sought to apply §
2042(2) is in the area of incidents of ownership held by the insured as a
fiduciary. Skifter and one other recent decision, Estate of Fruehauf v. Commis-
sioner,10 are the only cases which have dealt directly with this issue. An exami-
nation of the trial and appellate court opinions in Fruehauf and Skirter demon-
strates that a conflict exists among the circuits and within the Tax Court con-
cerning the congressional purpose and intended scope of the incidents of owner-
ship test of § 2042 (2).
In Fruehauf, the decedent's wife had applied for, paid for, and owned six
insurance policies on the decedent's life. Mrs. Fruehauf predeceased her husband
and the policies passed to a residuary trust created by her will which named her
husband as life income beneficiary and appointed him executor and cotrustee.
The trust instrument empowered the trustees to sell, assign or surrender any of the
policies for their cash surrender value if they determined it advisable to do so.
The Commissioner, after Mr. Fruehauf's death, determined that these powers
were incidents of ownership under § 2042. The executor of his estate argued that
the powers acquired by the insured over the policies on his life were not includ-
able in his gross estate for two reasons. First, the executor focused on the lan-
guage of Treasury Regulation § 20.2042-1 (c) (2) and contended that this reg-
ulation should be interpreted as limiting incidents of ownership to the right of
the insured or his estate to receive the economic benefits of the policies. The Tax
Court felt that there was no merit to this argument, characterizing the right to the
economic benefits of the policy as "merely one of the several incidents of owner-
transfer of property in contemplation of death under § 2035. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (a) (2)
(1958).
5 Articles dealing with recent estate tax developments in the life insurance area include:
Simmons, "Incidents of Ownership--Some Haunting Reminders, 57 A.B.A.J. 815 (1971);
Eliasberg, Life Insurance: Recent Estate Tax Developments, 48 Txxs 399 '(1970); Sub-
committee of Committee on Estate and Tax Planning, Recent Federal Estate Tax Develop-
ments Involving Life Insurance, reprinted in 5 REAL PRop., PROBATE & TRUST J. 202 (1970);
Subcommittee of Committee on Estate and Tax Planning, Life Insurance and Federal Estate
Tax: Recent Developments, reprinted in 5 REAL PRoP., PROBATE & TRUST J. 401 (1970).
6 A recent Tax Court case exemplifies the attention given to life insurance in the estate
tax context. The Internal Revenue Service unsuccessfully argued that a veto power over any
attempted alienation of an insurance policy owned by a business partner to fund a cross-
purchase buy-sell agreement was an incident of ownership. Howard F. Infante, 39 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 11 70,206 (1970).
7 INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 7 (1972).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 427 F.2d 80 (1970).
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ship."'  In support of its view the court cited United States v. Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co., in which the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had
addressed the same argument:
Plaintiffs seize on Section 20.2042-1 (c) (2) of the Treasury Regulations
on Estate Tax, which says "... . the term 'incidents of ownership' is not limited
in its meaning to ownership of the policy in the technical legal sense. Gen-
erally speaking, the term has reference to the right of the insured or his
estate to the economic benefits of the policy." Plaintiffs urge that there must
be "a real control over the economic benefits." To this there are two
answers. First, it is clear that the reference to ownership in the "technical
legal sense" is not abandoned and supplanted by reference to "economic
benefits." Second, the regulation goes on to list illustrative powers referred
to by Congress in its reports. All of these are powers which may or may
not enrich decedent's estate, but which can affect the transfer of the policy
proceeds. 12
The second contention of the executor in Fruehauf was that the term "in-
cidents of ownership" did not include powers exercisable only in a fiduciary
capacity. In support of the argument the petitioners relied on two prior Tax
Court decisions, Estate of Newcomb Carlton3 and Estate of Bert L. Fuchs,'
which had distinguished powers held in a fiduciary capacity. However, the Tax
Court failed to follow these decisions, relying again on Rhode Island Hospital
Trust, where, after examining the background of § 2042, the court held that the
relevant question to ask with respect to this statute was: "Did he [the insured]
have a capacity to affect the disposition of the policy if he had wanted to?"' 5 In
implementing this approach the court analogized to cases under what is presently
§ 2038 which had held that the capacity in which a power to alter, amend,
revoke or terminate was reserved is irrelevant. 6 Since capacity had been held
immaterial for purposes of § 2038, the court reasoned that it was illogical to hold
capacity as a relevant factor under § 2042, stating that "[t]here is no doubt at
all but that sections 2038 and 2042 are parts of a tax pattern to make includable
in the gross estate property over which the decedent held various powers affect-
ing beneficial enjoyment."'" Four judges concurred as to the result in Fruehauf,
but only because the power could be exercised by the insured so as to benefit him-
self in his individual capacity as life income beneficiary.'
In both Carlton and Fuchs the Tax Court, in holding insurance proceeds
not includable, had distinguished prior cases on the ground that the fiduciary
powers could not be exercised for the insured's benefit in his individual capacity.
In Carlton the insured had placed several insurance policies in a trust reserv-
11 Estate of Harry R. Fruehauf, 50 T.C. 915, 919 (1968).
12 355 F.2d 7, 11 (lst Cir. 1966).
13 34 T.G. 988 (1960), rev-d o n other grounds, 298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962).
14 47 T.C. 199 (1966).
15 355 F.2d at 11.
16 Section 2038 requires the inclusion of any property in which the decedent possesses
at his death a power to alter, amend, revoke or terminate even though the decedent has
made a transfer of the property prior to his death. The addition of the language "in what-
ever capacity exercisable" in 1954 has removed any question of capacity under § 2038.




hig the right to appoint a successor trustee, including himself. The Commissioner
argued that had he appointed himself a cotrustee he would have possessed broad
powers to deal with the policies which would constitute incidents of ownership.
In support of this argument the Commissioner relied upon Estate of Myron
Selznick,19 where the reservation by the grantor of the right to cancel policies
he had placed in an irrevocable trust was held to be an incident of ownership.
The Tax Court distinguished this case on the fact that Selznick, in addition to
this reserved right, was the life income beneficiary of the trust which would have
permitted him to receive income from the investment of the cash surrender value
had he cancelled the policies.2" In Carlton, however, the court made it clear that
this was not the case:
Any control that decedent would have acquired over the insurance policies
had he appointed himself cotrustee would have been control over the policies
jointly with the corporate trustee as trustee only and such control would
be solely for the benefit of the trust. Such control as trustee would not con-
stitute incidents of ownership in the insurance policies in decedent except in
his capacity as trustee for the benefit of the trust.
21
In Fuchs the decedent was one of three business partners who had funded
an oral buy-sell agreement with life insurance. It was agreed that each partner
was to own and be the beneficiary of policies on the life of the other two partners
so that the insured would not possess any incidents of ownership in the policies.
One group of these policies was mistakenly issued naming the insured rather than
the designated beneficiary as owner, so that the insured possessed the incidents of
ownership under the policy. Although a trust was not involved, the Tax Court
likened the position of the decedent to that of a trustee and stated: "Decedent
merely had the ... power to affect trust proceeds. We do not believe that this
type of naked power alone is sufficient to bring the insurance proceeds within
decedent's gross estate."2 The Tax Court concluded that the partnership agree-
ment effectively prevented the decedent from using or disposing of the policies so
as to receive the economic benefits therefrom, "or to procure any other satisfac-
tions which are of economic worth."23 In support of this view that § 2042 re-
quires inclusion only if economic benefits can flow to the insured, the Tax Court
cited Treasury Regulation § 20.2042-1 (c) (2), focusing on the same language as
the executor in Fruehauf had done. Fuchs and Carlton clearly provide a basis
for the distinction drawn by the concurring opinion in Fruehauf. Both cases, at
least in dicta, recognized fiduciary capacity as a relevant distinction and, more
importantly, in both cases the lack of ability to benefit economically from the
alleged incident of ownership was controlling.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Fruehauf on appeal,
but explicitly rejected the majority's broad per se rule that fiduciary powers
possessed by an insured are incidents of ownership. 4 The court of appeals chal-
19 15 T.C. 716 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 195 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1952).
20 34 T.C. at 996.
21 Id.
22 47 T.C. at 204.
23 Id. at 206.
24 427 F.2d at 85.
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lenged the Tax Court's reliance upon cases which held that fiduciary capacity
is inconsequential under § 2038. The § 2038 analogy was deemed inappropriate
because § 2038 deals with the possession of a power by a "transferor."25 Under
§ 2042, however, the insured need only be a mere "transferee" (as in Fruehauf)
since no transfer is required by this section. The appellate court cited Fuchs and
Carlton, stating: "We believe that the Tax Court in this case ignored what it
had clearly recognized in these prior cases, i.e., the fundamental nature of the
fiduciary relationship."26 The court implicitly rejected Rhode Island Hospital
Trust, without discussing it, by adopting the approach of the concurring opinion.
As in the concurring opinion, the only apparent justification for making this dis-
tinction based on the decedent's ability to exercise the fiduciary powers for his
beneficial enjoyment was the approach of Carlton and Fuchs.
In Skifter, the Tax Court did not focus on Carlton and Fuchs, although it
recognized that its result found "some support" in both cases.2" The Fruehauf
opinion was distinguished on the ground that Skifter's power to dispose of the
policies and terminate the trust in favor of the life income beneficiary could not
be exercised so as to be of benefit to himself.2" Since Fruehauf had been able
to benefit himself, the Tax Court in Skifter determined that the issue before the
court was a novel one. In deciding this issue the court tried to discern the intent
of Congress by looking to the legislative history of § 2042. Particular significance
was placed upon the Senate Committee Report concerning the elimination of
the premium payment test.2 9 By eliminating the premium payment test the court
felt that Congress had refused to accept the notion that life insurance was in-
herently testamentary in character. For this reason the court stated:
[1]t seems inconceivable to us that Congress would have intended the pro-
ceeds to be included in the insured's gross estate in such circumstances
merely because the third-party owner of the policy had entrusted the in-
sured with fiduciary powers that were exercisable only for the benefit of
persons other than the insured.'
As in Fuchs, the Tax Court relied upon the language of Treasury Regula-
tion § 20.2042-1 (c) (2) which states that "[g]enerally speaking, the term [inci-
dents of ownership] has reference to the right of the insured or his estate to the
economic benefits of the policy.""1 However, the court admitted that it was
25 Id. at 84.
26 Id. at 85.
27 56 T.C. at 1197.
28 Id.
29 S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954). The premium payment test,
eliminated in 1954, required the inclusion in the gross estate of the insured the proportion
of the proceeds attributable to premium payments made by the insured even though he had
divested himself of all the incidents of ownership in the policies.
30 56 T.C. at 1197.
31 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) provides in part:
(c) Receivable by other beneficiaries. * *
(2) For purposes of this paragraph, the term "incidents of ownership" is not
limited in its meaning to ownership of the policy in the technical legal sense. Gen-
erally speaking, the term has reference to the right of the insured or his estate to
the economic benefits of the policy. Thus, it includes the power to change the bene-
ficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assign-
ment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan against
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troubled by the broad language of Treasury Regulation § 20.2(42-1(c) (4)32
which appeared to cover precisely the fact pattern before the court and would
require the inclusion of the proceeds even though the decedent had no beneficial
interest in the trust. Instead of invalidating the regulation, the court simply
refused to apply it on the grounds that the Congressional Committee Report
appeared "to suggest an effort to treat life insurance in the same manner as




This approach was adopted and expanded upon by the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Skifter. Speaking for the court, Judge Lumbard first
noted as "significant" the fact that the "reference point" of Treasury Regulation
§ 20.2042-1 (c) (2) is the right to the economic benefits of the policy, and that
Skifter was unable to derive for himself any economic benefits from the policies.3
Judge Lumbard next examined the Senate Finance Committee Report dealing
with the elimination of the premium payment test and reached a conclusion
similar to that reached by the Tax Court, namely, "that Congress intended §
2042 to parallel the statutory scheme governing the interest and powers that
would cause other types of property to be included in a decedent's estate.""5 The
court felt that this inference was supported by the fact that at the time of the
elimination of the premium payment test § 2042(2) had been amended to pro-
vide that the term "incidents of ownership" include a 51% reversionary interest
similar to that required under § 2037."
Admitting that this legislative history was "hardly conclusive on the mat-
ter," the court proceeded to try to discern whether Skifter's fiduciary power
would require the inclusion of the proceeds in his gross estate under any of the
other inclusion sections. Skifter's power as transferee was not includable under
§ 2036 since that section applies only to powers retained by the grantor. There
would have been a "powerful argument" under § 2041 that this was an incident
of ownership if it could have been exercisable for Skifter's benefit, or for the bene-
fit of whomever Skifter selected, since Skifter would then have had the equiv-
the surrender value of the policy, etc. Similarly, the term includes a power to
change the beneficiary reserved to a corporation of which the decedent is sole stock-
holder.
(4) A decedent is considered to have an "incident of ownership" in an insur-
ance policy on his life held in trust if, under the terms of the policy, the decedent
(either alone or in conjunction with another person or persons) has the power (as
trustee or otherwise) to change the beneficial ownership in the policy or its proceeds,
or the time or manner of enjoyment thereof, even though the decedent has no bene-
ficial interest in the trust. Moreover, assuming the decedent created the trust, such
a power may result in the inclusion in the decedent's gross estate under section
2036 or 2038 of other property transferred by the decedent to the trust if, for
example, the decedent has the power to surrender the insurance policy and if the
income otherwise used to pay premiums on the policy would become currently pay-
able to a beneficiary of the trust in the event that the policy were surrendered.
32 Id.
33 56 T.C. at 1199.






alent of a power of appointment. 8 Judge Lumbard had a harder time dis-
missing the possibility that Skifter's fiduciary powers would be includable under
§ 2038. A literal application of the language of this section requires only that
the decedent have at any time made a transfer of property where the enjoyment
thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise
of a power, in whatever capacity exercisable, "without regard to when or from
what source the decedent acquired such power,"'9 to alter, amend, revoke or
terminate. Although the emphasized language would appear to indicate that
§ 2038 would apply, even when a power was acquired under the circumstances
present in Skifter, the court felt it was significant that this language had been
added in response to White v. Poor,4" and had been applied strictly to the facts
of that case. In White the settlor, after establishing a trust, was subsequently
appointed as successor trustee. Although at his death he possessed a § 2038
power to terminate the trust, the Supreme Court refused to include the trust
proceeds in his estate since he had not retained the power at the time of the
transfer.41 Even though § 2038 was potentially applicable, the court in Skifter
distinguished the case before it on the ground that White had only been applied
where the decedent had created the power in someone else at the time of the
transfer and later acquired the power, whereas Skifter had not created the trust
but had merely acquired the power under his wife's will.42 Since none of the
other parallel statutory sections would require the inclusion of property subject
to the same powers as Skifter possessed, the court held that § 2042 was not
applicable to Skifter. The court affirmed the Tax Court's determination that
Treasury Regulation § 20.2042-1 (c) (4) should be applied only to reservations
of trust powers created by the transferor and which the transferor possessed as
trustee.4
This inference, that Congress did not intend to produce divergent estate
tax treatment between life insurance and other types of property, is unwarranted.
The premium payment test required that the proportion of the proceeds repre-
sented by any direct or indirect payment of premiums by the decedent be in-
cluded in his gross estate regardless of whether he possessed any incidents of own-
ership at his death. Under this test the insured could never remove from his
gross estate that portion of the proceeds attributable to premiums paid by him.
Congress sought only to change this result, justifying the change as "merely
putting life insurance on a par with other property which may be given away
free from estate tax if the gift is not made 'in contemplation of death.' "" Judge
Lumbard sought to bolster this inference by the fact that Congress, at the time
of the elimination of the premium payment test, explicitly provided that a rever-
sionary interest was an incident of ownership and that Congress treated it "in a
manner closely paralleling the treatment that § 2037 gives to reversionary in-
38 Id. at 703.
39 INT. REV. CODE of 1954-, § 2038.
40 296 U.S. 98 (1935).
41 Id. at 102.
42 468 F.2d at 704.
43 Id. at 705.
44 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1954).
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terests in other property."4 The fact that Congress merely adapted an existing
set of rules for determining whether a reversionary interest exceeded 5% rather
than develop an entirely new body of rules cannot be given any substantial
weight. In addition to the 5,% requirement, § 2037 requires two elements not
required by § 2042; a transfer by decedent and a survivorship requirement."6
The legislative history shows that Congress was aware of this divergence in
requirements when it adopted these valuation rules for purposes of § 2042."'
If this was a question of first impression, the court, under its approach in Skifter,
would have had to read these additional requirements in so as to at least give
life insurance policies estate tax treatment that parallels the treatment given to
other types of property. The dangers of such an approach are apparent from
the necessity of the court to qualify its opinion with regard to the coverage of
§ 2038. This approach offers little as long as there are open questions and un-
certainty in the parallel statutory areas.
The conflict among the circuits, as to whether the incidents of ownership
test has reference to any of the bundle of rights resulting from the insurance
contract which give the insured the ability to affect the beneficial enjoyment of
the proceeds, or only to powers of economic worth to the insured, is still unre-
solved. It would appear that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Skifter would support the latter view since it noted as significant the emphasis
45 468 F.2d at 702.
46 INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 2037 provides:
Transfers Taking Effect at Death.
(a) GENERAL RULE.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of
all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time after September 7, 1916, made a transfer '(except in case of a bona fide sale
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or
otherwise, ifo
(1) possession or enjoyment of the property can, through ownership of
such interest, be obtained only by surviving the decedent, and
(2) the decedent has retained a reversionary interest in the property (but
in the case of a transfer made before October 8, 1949, only if such reversionary
interest arose by the express terms of the instrument of transfer), and the value
of such reversionary interest immediately before the death of the decedent
exceeds 5 percent of the value of such property.
(b) SPECIAL RuLs.-For purposes of this section, the term "reversionary in-
terest" includes a possibility that property transferred by the decedent-
(1) may return to him or his estate, or
(2) may be subject to a power of disposition by him,
but such term does not include a possibility that the income alone from such property
may return to him or become subject to a power of disposition by him. The value
of a reversionary interest immediately before the death of the decedent shall be
determined (without regard to the fact of the decedent's death) by usual methods
of valuation, including the use of tables of mortality and actuarial principles, under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate. In determining the value of
a possibility that property may be subject to a power of disposition by the decedent,
such possibility shall be valued as if it were a possibility that such property may
return to the decedent or his estate. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an interest so
transferred shall not be included in the decedent's gross estate under this section if
possession or enjoyment of the property could have been obtained by any beneficiary
during the decedent's life through the exercise of a general power of appointment (as
defined in section 2041) which in fact was exercisable immediately before the dece-
dent's death.
47 "In determining whether such interest exceeded 5 percent, this section provides rules
essentially the same as prescribed in section 2037 for determining whether, in the case of certain
transfers, the decedent retained a reversionary interest in the transferred property." S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 473 '(1954).
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on the right to the economic benefits of the policies in Treasury Regulation §
20.2042-1 (c) (2); its conclusion comports with the views of the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in Fruehauf. The Tax Court has also supported the latter
view in the Fuchs, Carlton and Skifter decisions. On the other hand, the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit clearly expressed its support of the former view
in Rhode Island Hospital Trust, which was followed by the Tax Court in
Fruehauf.
The approach of Rhode Island Hospital Trust adopted by the Tax Court
in Fruehauf appears to be the correct one. The incident of ownership doctrine
originated with Chase National Bank v. United States.4 8 In this case the con-
stitutionality of the predecessor of § 2042 (2) was upheld as a transfer tax since
the insured had incidents of ownership in the insurance at his death. The
Treasury Department and the lower federal courts drew the negative inference
from the case that unless the insured possessed some incident of ownership the
tax would be invalid as a form of direct taxation without apportionment.4 9
Rhode Island Hospital Trust cites Chase National Bank as authority that Con-
gress was attempting to tax the power to affect the transfer of the policy pro-
ceeds." This reliance appears to be justified for in Chase National Bank the
Supreme Court stated:
A power in the decedent to surrender and cancel the policies . . . is
by no means the least substantial of the legal incidents of ownership, and
its termination at his death so as to free the beneficiaries of the policy from
the possibility of its exercise would seem to be no less a transfer within
the reach of the taxing power than a transfer effected in other ways through
death.-1
The Tax Court in Fuchs and Skifter and the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in Fruehauf based their holdings upon the language of Treasury
Regulation § 20.2042-1 (c) (2) emphasizing "the right to . . . the economic
benefits of the policy." This regulation was based upon the House Committee
Reports of the 77th Congress which, in enacting the predecessor of § 2042(2),
realized that no explanation of the term "incidents of ownership" had been
given in the statute. The Committee stated:
There is no specific enumeration of incidents of ownership, the pos-
session of which at death forms the basis for inclusion of insurance proceeds
in the gross estate, as it is impossible to include an exhaustive list. Examples
of such incidents are the right of the insured or his estate to the economic
benefits of the insurance, the power to change the beneficiary, the power to
surrender or cancel the policy, the power to assign it, the power to revoke
an assignment, the power to pledge the policy for a loan, or the power to
obtain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the policy.
Incidents of ownership are not confined to those possessed by the decedent
48 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
49 C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GnFT TAXEs 274 (2d ed. 1962); 1
FED. EsT. & GIFT TAx REP. 1670.46 (1971).
50 355 F.2d at 10.
51 278 U.S. at 335.
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in a technical legal sense. For example, a power to change the beneficiary
reserved to a corporation of which the decedent is sole stockholder is an
incident of ownership in the decedent.
52
The regulation under the 1939 Code adopted this language verbatim,"3 and it
was only after the passage of the 1954 Code that the Treasury Department re-
phrased the regulation emphasizing the right to the economic benefits of the
policy which resulted in the inference that it was the intention of Congress to
include only powers of economic worth to the insured. An examination of the
regulation's origin and the prior regulation seriously undermines the strength
of this inference. Certainly this inference should not be used to limit the appli-
cation of Treasury Regulation § 20.2042-1(c) (4), which was added by the
Treasury Department at the same time that Treasury Regulation § 20.2042-
1 (c) (2) was rephrased.
Section 2042(2) taxes a power to affect the beneficial enjoyment of the
insurance proceeds possessed by the insured at his death. In light of this ap-
proach, the analogy drawn by the Tax Court to the lack of distinction with
regard to capacity in § 2038 is a valid one. This analogy is not dependent upon
the fact that Fruehauf was a transferee rather than a transferor. The attempt
to distinguish on this point by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is
devoid of merit. Section 2042(2) merely requires that the insured be in pos-
session of an incident of ownership at the time of his death. This is supported
by the fact that Treasury Regulation § 20.2042-1 (c) (4) explicitly requires the
inclusion of proceeds in both the Fruehauf and Skifter fact patterns. Until there
is some clarification of this conflict among the circuits either by the Supreme
Court or, preferably by legislative action, the responsibility is upon the estate
planning bar to avoid exposing clients to this situation by making certain that
the insured will not be given any powers over the policy, as fiduciary or other-
wise, should the insured survive the owner.
Thomas L. Poscharsky
52 H.R. RP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1942-2 CuM. BULL. 491.
53 Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.25, T.D. 5239, 1943 CuM. BULL. 1091.
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